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Abstract   Literature on agency problems arising between controlling and minority owners 
claim that separation of cash flow and control rights allows controllers to expropriate listed 
firms, and further that separation emerges when dual class shares or pyramiding corporate 
structures exist. Dual class share and pyramiding coexisted in listed companies of China until 
discriminated share reform was implemented in 2005. This paper presents a model of controller 
to expropriate behavior as well as empirical tests of expropriation via particular accounting 
items and pyramiding generated expropriation. Results show that expropriation is apparent for 
state controlled listed companies. While reforms have weakened the power to expropriate, 
separation remains and still generates expropriation. Size of expropriation is estimated to be 7 to 
8 per cent of total asset at mean. If the “one share, one vote” principle were to be realized, asset 
inflation could be reduced by 13 percent.  
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1? Introduction 
In the gradualism transition process of Asian post-planned economies, the state sector still retains 
control over most of economic activity. This control may have prevented a collapse of institutions 
and also may have facilitated sound economic transactions so far. Because of this, the gradualism 
transition process has been evaluated highly because it has accomplished a “Parato maintaining 
process” that has generated no loser in the society (McMillan and Naughton [1992], Lau and Qian, 
Roland [2000], Qian[2003]).? Consistent with this evaluation, China, Viet Nam and Myanmar have 
enjoyed steady growth of their macro economies during the era of gradual reform. The share of the 
state sector in these economies has remained substantial or has been increasing over the course of 
reform.  
 State owned firms, who can exert both economic and political power, are so influential that 
they can change the nature of institutions from the purpose for which they were originally designed. 
For example, in a stock market, a controlling owner with overwhelming power may offend the 
interests of minority owners even though the law provides equality among shareholders. In China, 
several scandals have occurred where controlling owners pumped up resources of a listed company 
that later led to bankruptcy of that company. Defects of the inappropriately functioning stock market 
were apparent in the society until the middle 2000’s. From 2005, the Chinese government started a 
reform of the “discriminate share structure” of listed companies and “defrosting” circulation of 
locked shares. Thanks to this reform, many listed companies were able to clean up their balance 
sheets and dissolve the dual class share structure that had been inducing “expropriation” and illegally 
occupying assets of others by controlling owners. However, the pyramidal ownership structure that 
allows a controlling owner to expropriate a listed company still remains.   
This paper follows of the course of literature on agency problems between controlling 
owners and minorities, including the work of Fama and Jensen (1983) , Hart(2001), La Prota, 
de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998) , Bebchuk(1999), Bebchuk et.al (2000), Classen, Djankov, Fan and 
Lang (1999), Claessen, Djankov and Lang (2000)?Faccio, Lang and Yong (2001), and Fan, Wong and 
Zhang (2005). However, the work presented here is original in the following ways: (1) This paper set a 
behavioral model of expropriation by controlling owners over listed companies. Estimation is done  
based on the structural model. It allows us to check whether or not the expropriation occurred due to 
inflating total assets is directly estimated. (2)  Structural model allow us to obtain structural 
parameters that measures size of expropriation. Data that can distinguish control right and cash flow 
right enabled us to estimate the parameters. (3) A finding is that expropriation via account 
receivables is very popular in China for all the period since 1978 to 2007 for the state owned listed 
firms. Another is that the separation of cash flow and control rights exists and it generated 
expropriation. Further, privately owned listed firms do not show expropriation contrary to the 
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previous researches result in other Asian economies. (4) Expropriation due to pyramiding was found 
to still exist even for the sample that “discriminated share reform” completed and “dual class share” 
structure dissolved.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 includes description of literature on agency 
problems between controlling and minority owners as well as the institutional setting and structure 
of China’s equity market and corporate governance systems over listed companies. A simple 
theoretical model of expropriation by controlling owners is presented in Section 3 along with an 
empirical test hypothesis. Description of data and estimation strategies are given in Section 4, and 
Section 5 includes discussion of results. Conclusions are provided in Section 6.  
 
2  Literature and Chinese Institutions  
2.1 Literature on the Agency Problem of “Concentrated Ownership”  
 “Expropriating” behavior of concentrated owners is the main topic of recent corporate governance 
literature. The standard literature on corporate governance and ownership (such as Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) has analyzed agency problems between management and owners. Recent literature 
has focused on structure among owners and conflicts of interests between owners. Distribution of 
ownership is strikingly different among economies. In the United States or Japan, most shares are 
diversified, and it is rare to recognize a concentrated owner with more than a ten percent share in a 
listed company. However, in most developing economies, each listed company has in most cases one 
concentrated owner or block of shareholders who can exercise overwhelming power over the 
management and other minority shareholders. Agency problems between concentrated and minority 
shareholders may easily emerge.  
If both concentrated and minority shareholders focus on maximizing only monetary 
benefit from the company, their interests coincides with each other, and a conflict of interest between 
them will not emerge. However, such conflict of interest does occur often in the real world. 
Theoretical literature on corporate governance argues that this happens when a controlling owner has 
the motive to extract private (non monetary) as well as monetary benefits under certain types of 
corporate or share structures (Bebchuk [1999], Bebchuk et.al [2000], Claessen et.al [2000]?Faccio, 
Lang and Yong [2001]).  
The literature argues that the controlling owner will be able to exert stronger controlling 
power (control right) over the decision making of the listed company relative to the size of the shares 
(cash flow right) in their hand. This phenomenon is called “separation of cash flow and control 
rights”, and researchers in the literature claim that this separation may emerge via the following 
three types of structure (Bebchuk et.al [2000]): 
 (a) Pyramiding. Formation of a corporate group by investing vertically, such as when a holding 
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company invests in its subsidiary and the subsidiary invests in its subsidiary and lets the second or 
third subsidiary list their shares and finances for the whole group. Pyramiding is common in Asian 
countries and is typical of large ethnic Chinese firms. It is the most commonly used mechanism for 
concentrating control in a controlling minority structure (La Porta, de-Silanes and Shleifer [1999]). 
Enumeration of cash flow right and control right are defined under this structure following La Porta, 
et.al (1999) and Bebchuk et.al(2000) as in Figure 1-1.  
    (b) Cross-Holding. A share is cross-held between member companies of a group in which the 
controlling right of a core or holding company in the group may be increased by each share. This is a 
famous and typical Japanese ownership style but rare in other Asian economies. 
    (c) Dual Class Share. Heterogeneous shares such as common and preferred stock coexist and 
give the controlling owner a stronger controlling right than the cash flow right in their hand (Figure 
1-2). This is common in countries with French laws such as many Latin American economies. Most 
corporate laws in countries influenced by the German law system, including China, prohibit 
violation of the one share one vote principle. However, dual share systems existed in China until 
very recently.  
 
2.2 Separation of Control and Cash Flow Rights in China 
What are the institutions and structures that affect the behavior of controlling owners in China?  
Institutional settings in China related to the controlling owner of listed firms are described in this 
section.  
 
2.2.1 Concentrated Ownership Structure 
Table 1 presents an international comparison of the distribution of control rights. The largest owners 
of listed companies in China hold about 35 percent of shares at mean and median. The second largest 
owners only hold six percent at median and nine percent at mean. These statistics reveal that China 
belongs to a “concentrated ownership structure” group together with France and/or Germany, and is 
different from a highly “dispersed ownership” group such as the United States, United Kingdom, or 
Japan. This “concentrated ownership structure” is easily subject to controlling owners violating the 
interests of minority shareholders. In terms of ownership type, the state sector is the largest 
controller; this was 60 to 80 percent during 1999 to 2007 (Table 2).  
 
2.2.2   Dual Class Share in China: “Discriminated Shares” 
In most civil law, particularly German law related economies, companies are prohibited from 
violating the “one share one vote principle”. Company law in China also includes similar provisions. 
However, for listing companies, the government imposes restrictions on the circulation of particular 
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types of shares.  
    The Chinese government has been reluctant to circulate control rights of firms, particularly 
those of large companies like listed ones, because the government has wished to maintain power to 
control the whole economy. In the early 1990’s, the government introduced discriminative control 
over the shares of listed companies. Shares were classified into: (1) state shares, (2) corporate shares 
(state owned corporation and other corporate shares), (3) individual shares, and (4) foreign shares. 
State shares (1) and state corporate shares (a part of [2]) are called “state owned shares.” In the late 
1990’s, when massive numbers of old type SOE’s started being transformed into “limited share 
corporations” (corporations under company law), the government demanded that “state owned 
shares” be the controlling shares, ideally more than 50 percent but at least 25 percent. State shares 
(1) were allowed to be sold and bought between state and private sectors but this also required 
permission of the State Asset Committee in addition to decisions at board meetings inside the 
company. State shares (1) and corporate shares (2) were prohibited from being transacted on the 
security market according to several administrative guidelines1. These administrative guidelines 
generated discrimination of “circulating shares” and “non-circulating shares.”  
    Table 3 shows the distribution of various types of shares of listed companies in China. 
Non-circulating shares were 56 and 52 percents of total share both respectively in 2000 and 
2007(Table 4), state share has of 36 and 49 per cent among them. Thus, dual class share exists in 
China. 
 
2.2.3   Pyramiding in China  
As in other economies in Asia, pyramiding is very prevalent in China. Listed companies are often 
owned and controlled by intermediate companies called “holding companies” or “jituan gongsi” (a 
direct translation is “group company”). Most listed companies have been established in order to 
function as a financing channel for the corporate group or controlling owner, particularly for the 
companies listed in the early period. Companies that run the actual business do not have their shares 
made public in the equity market. In China, all listed companies are required to disclose on the 
annual financial statement detailed information regarding their ultimate controller and pyramidal 
ownership structure. Specifically, figures depicting pyramid structures have been disclosed since 
2001. Thanks to this requirement for listed companies, a researcher can accurately trace the number 
                                                  
1 Institutions were structured based on the following administrative documents: 1992 May, 15th, 
“Procedure on Experiments to Introduce the Limited Share Company“, “Opinion on Introducing the 
Share Limited Company”. 1993 April, 22nd, “Provisional Ordinance on Management of Issuing and 
Transaction of Share.” 1994 March, 11th “Provisional Procedure of Treatment of State Owned Shares in 
Share Limited Company Experiments”. 1994, November 3rd,”Provicinal Procedure of Treatment of State 
Owned Shares in Share Limited Company” (See, Nomura Capital Market Research 2008) 
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of pyramid layers and can enumerate the size of cash flow and control rights. 
 
2.2.4  Data on Cash Flow and Control Rights: the Pyramid Layer in China 
Research has been accumulating on the presence of separation among controlling and cash flow 
rights in China. Teneve et.al (2002) tried to document and measure this when disclosure of 
information on the whole pyramidal structure was not formally required. Based on their original 
survey to 257 firms it was found that listed companies in the Shanghai Exchange, non-circulating 
shareholders, state, legal persons and employees dispatched 72 out of 76 directors of surveyed 
companies. If this number is regarded as a proxy of control rights, non-circulating shareholders held 
95 percent of control rights, this in contrast to their cash flow share of 70 percent. They asserted the 
existence of separation of control and cash flow rights. Fan, Wong and Zhang (2005) were the first to 
document the number of pyramid layers for a sample of newly listed companies. They also measured 
the size of control and cash flow rights based on the layer structure. Their data shows that for about 
60 percent of the firms that were going to issue their shares for the first time, the number of pyramid 
layers was two on average. Pyramid layers are thicker for privately controlled firms than for 
government controlled firms. The ratio of cash-flow to control rights is higher for government 
controlled firms (.97) than for privately controlled firms (.54). 
 Data that this paper used includes information of pyramidal ownership structures for the 
all listed companies for the 2006 and 2007 when share structure reform proceeds (Table 4). A similar 
tendency in the number of pyramids as well as cash flow and control rights may be seen. The 
number of pyramids for privately controlled firms (2.5 at mean) is larger than that of state 
controlling firms (2.4 at mean). The ratio of cash-flow to control rights of privately controlled firms 
(.70 at mean, .76 at median) is lower than that of state controlled firms (.90 at mean and 1 at 
median).  
Literature on agency problems between controlling owners and minority share holders has 
discussed agency problems among privately owned firms. The above data implies that privately 
controlled firms have more pyramid layers and larger separation of control and cash-flow rights in 
China. However, this agency problem may occur in state owned firms as well if there are private 
benefits and the corporate structures mentioned above. Case studies in China reveal that listed 
companies under the state sector have gone bankrupt as a result of expropriation via accounts 
receivable.   
     In China, listed companies are ultimately owned by the state sector which consists of the 
central and local governments. About 60 to 80 percent of listed companies from the 1990’s to 2007 
have been ultimately owned and controlled by the state sector (Table 1). Anecdotal evidence reveals 
that there has been expropriation in state controlled listed firms. 
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2.3 “Expropriation” via Accounts Receivable: The Case of Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle 
There is no indication in the literature of the channel through which expropriation occurs. Classens 
Djankov, Fan, and Lang (1999) regressed separation of control and cash flow rights on market 
valuation change. However, they did not set a behavioral model. Expropriation or private 
consumption of assets by controlling owners is to some extent traceable through financial statements. 
Because listed companies cannot throw away money with no record, these firms accomplish their 
negative behavior by hiding accounting items in financial statements that are used as channels of 
expropriation.  
    In the case of China, accounting items relating to trade credit are often used as channels of 
expropriation. If listed firms have accounts receivable related to some entity that are not settled for a 
long time, the entity expropriates the cash of a given listed company. In this case, the assets of the 
listed company look large, but the expropriating part is non-performing and is a dead asset. The 
exact fraction that has been expropriated may be unobservable, but this dead asset is a part of the 
accounts receivable presented on the balance sheet of the listed company. Expropriation may also go 
in the opposite direction. If the listed company does not make settlement of accounts payable to 
some firm for a long time, the listed company may expropriate their trading partner. This 
expropriation becomes a part of accounts payable of the listed company’s balance sheet. Thus, 
expropriation of the listed company may be hidden in some accounting items on the asset side of the 
balance sheet (Regarding structure of balance sheets, see the conceptual explanation in Figure 2). 
Particularly in China, direct lending between firms was legally prohibited even in 2009. Trade credit 
has been functioning as an alternative to inter-firm lending and has become a channel of “asset 
expropriation,” and expropriation via accounts receivable has brought about bankruptcy of some 
listed companies.  
Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle, a state controlled company under the Jinan Municipal City 
government, Shangdong Province, was the number one company in the motorcycle market of China 
and one of the most active emerging companies in the 1990’s. In its annual report of 2001, the Jinan 
Qingqi Motorcycle, Co. Ltd. auditor announced that judgment regarding a part of accounts 
receivable and loan guarantees toward the holding company of China Qingqi Motorcycle Group 
Company, the controlling owner of the listed company, would be withheld. The listed company 
focused on production of motorcycles, and it depended on the China Qingqi Group Company, the 
holding company of the group and controlling owner of the listed company, for purchase of materials 
or patented technology and sales of goods. The listed company was heavily dependent on the 
holding company and in sales reached 45 percent of the total (Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle Co. Ltd. 
2000 Annual Report, p. 14). In 2001, accounts receivable of the holding company totaled 2.47 billion 
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RMB and for the subsidiary company in the group .343 billion RMB. It reached 62 percent of total 
assets, and total accounts receivable of the company were 63 percent of total assets. The auditor 
asserted in the annual report in 2001 that there was little prospect that the accounts receivable would 
be repaid until a substantial reconstruction of the holding company was begun. The auditor also 
claimed that the listed company had made a guarantee to the holding company and subsidiaries in 
the group regarding bank loans amounting to 739.86 million RMB; 471.57 million of this was in 
default by the end of 2001. The company turned deficits for two years from 2000.  
Table 5 presents the development of accounts receivable for the holding company as well as 
profit, sales, and assets of Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle. The auditor’s claim ignited a de facto 
bankruptcy process organized by the government. In 2003, The Jinan Municipal City Government, 
the ultimate controller of the listed company, announced a commitment to reduce the 
non-performing accounts receivable .6 to .8 billion RMB. This came to three times the total assets of 
the listed company in 2002. The Jinan Government simultaneously started to look for new investors 
who would merge the motorcycle production department (Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle Co. Ltd., Annual 
Report 2003, pp.19-20)2. This incident is a typical case in which a holding company expropriated the 
assets of a listed company via accounts receivable.  
 
2.4 “Discriminated Share Reform” since 2005  
In the early 2000’s, defects of “discriminated shares” and the presence of large blocks of 
concentrated owners, particularly in the background of state sectors in the stock market, became 
apparent. Expropriation via inter-firm transactions as in the case of Jinan Qingqi as well as various 
types of negative behavior by controlling owners became apparent. There was misuse of cash 
collected from minority shareholders without their consent. In one extreme case, dividend payments 
were paid in cash to shareholders immediately after a new increase in capital where that of most 
controlling owners did not increase but was just collected from minority shareholders. In this case, if 
the controlling owners had 60 percent of shares, they automatically received 60 percent of the cash 
collected from minority shareholders. In order to dissolve the unequal position of controlling and 
minority shareholders, and to realize the principle of “one share, one vote, one price,” the 
government announced that it would take steps to correct discrimination among the shares3. 
     Governmental reform demanded that each listed company negotiate among shareholders 
                                                  
2 Finally, the listed company sold out to state owned enterprises under the central government, the China 
Armament Industry Group in 2008. Jinan Municipal Government sold all shares of the company, 40.9 
percent, free of charge (Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle Co. Ltd. 2008 Annual Report, p.4). This reconstruction 
simultaneously proceeded with discriminated share reform.  
3 Committee of Security Regulation China, “Guidance on Experiment on Reform Discriminated Share” 
in 29 May, 2005. 
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regarding how to compromise the interests of circulating and the non-circulating shareholders in 
order to allow non-circulating shares to circulate. Each listed companies held a shareholder meeting 
and reached agreement on a scheme that would allow compensation from non-circulated to 
circulating shareholders. In most cases, circulating share holders were compensated by receiving 
additional shares free of charge. 66 percent of the reformed company gave the shares held by 
non-circulated owners to circulated owners, and 15 percent of the cases showed an increase in 
capital placed free of charge to circulating share holders (Nomura Institute of Capital Market 
Research, 2007). Through negotiation, over compensation schemes benefiting minority shareholders, 
the hidden legacy of past management that had piled up in the accumulation of non-performing 
accounts receivable assets, and a new scheme to write off non-performing assets, were discussed 
simultaneously. 
In the empirical study reported below, a simple behavior model is developed to capture 
expropriation behavior by inflating assets such as utilizing accounts receivable. Empirical test are 
then done to test whether or not expropriation has actually occurred, particularly after discriminated 
share reform was completed. 
 
3.  Empirical Framework 
3.1  A Model of “Expropriation” by Asset Inflation 
Here, I present a behavioral model of this empirical study. A listed firm has two heterogeneous 
owners: controlling owner and minority owners.? Manager of the firm completely follows decision 
by the controlling owner. Though the corporate law of China provided to maintain “one share one 
vote” principle, there is a difference in power influencing over decision making on firm. Under this 
setting, controlling owner can “expropriate” the asset of listed firm for the private purpose of 
controlling owner. There exists informational asymmetry between controlling owners and minority 
owners over decision by the controlling owner.   
A controlling owner of listed company will decide a level of asset size, by solving following 
constraint maximization problem. The objective function consists of monetary benefits from share 
holding and private benefits via expropriation. The former is represented in the first term of equation 
(1) which represents dividends according to owner cash flow rights. The latter is seen in the second 
term which includes private benefits gained via “expropriation.” The constraint equation (1a) 
describes factors of profit distribution to the stakeholders. This is assumed to be the sum of actual 




   )]([)]()([ KexPKexrKKf +−−ϕ         (1)  
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           s. t. iDqErK +=       (1a),  
where φ is the cash flow right ratio held by the controlling owner ( )10 ≤≤ϕ . K is capital or total 
assets of the company, Y is turnover, and r is the profit distribution for the investors. )(Kf  is a 
production function that generates turnover using the input of total assets, ex(K) is the 
“expropriation” function, and this is also assumed to be a function of total assets.  
KEXKexEX ln)( ≡=        (2). 
Here EX is assumed to be a function of a fraction of particular accounting items on the 
balance sheet such as accounts receivable (AR) or accounts payable (AP); these are utilized as a 
channel of expropriation and size of total assets(K). )(XP  is the private benefit from 
expropriation X: Here, it can be assumed that PXXP ≡)( . P is a parameter to capture size of 
private, or non-economic, benefit for the controlling owner from expropriation. 
The first order condition for this problem is derived as follows: 
         )(')(')(' KexPKexrKf ϕ−+=                      (3). 
 
3.1.1  Expropriation via Accounts Receivable 
Both the production function )(Kf and the expropriation function )(Kex  is assumed to take the  
Cobb-Douglas form. KaYKf ln)( ≡  has a derivative of Y/K,  KbEXKex ln)( ≡ has the 
derivative ex(K) on K as EX/K. This become αAR/K when we assume that  expropriation can be  
a fraction of accounts receivable (AR), EX=αAR. Plugging (3) and derivatives of )(Kf  and 
)(Kex , testable equations are derived as follows:  




Ya ϕααϕ −+=−+= K
AR)(')('    (4) 






Y εξϕβββ ++−+= 210
      (4a), 
    where, aPbaba /,/,/1 210 αβαββ === . ?  is cash flow right ratio of the 
controlling owners.  is unobservable motivation to expropriate, and  represents other 
unobservable factors.  Here, the first order condition implies following relationship: (1) If terms 
with )(Kxe ′  were statistically insignificant and only r significant, the size of total assets of the 
company would be at the socially efficient level. This would be free from any waste for 
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expropriation by the ultimate owner. (2) If the coefficients of )(Kxe ′ , particularly  , were 
confirmed to be statistically significant,  effective financial cost for the controlling owner would be 
lowered, and the assets of the firm is excessively and inefficiently increased. In this case, 
expropriation by the controlling owner emerges at a cost of the violation of minority shareholder’s 
interests.  
 
3.3.2 Expropriation due to Separation of Control and Cash-Flow Rights  
Literature related to agency problems of concentrated ownership indicates that separation of control 
and cash flow rights allows a concentrated owner to achieve expropriation to gain private benefit. 
This relationship is taken into consideration by inserting factors in the expropriation function. To 
make this relationship tractable, the expropriation function can be assumed to take the following 
form, instead of specification in eq. (2):  
21 )()|( αα ρρ gBKKexEX ≡=        (2’).    
ρ ( )10 ≤≤ ρ  is the ratio of “control right” of the ultimate controllers; this is the sum of 
shares controlled by the ultimate controller. Here, we assume XXP ≡)(  instead of 
PXXP ≡)(   for to make the test equation operational. Researcher does not know an exact form 
of  , . Thus, in this paper, we set g(  in two forms;  and  . The 
second form is motivated to directly capture relationship between control right and cash flow right.  
By inserting (2’) in the first order condition for the controller (eq. [2]), the test equation 
becomes: 
( ) 21 11)11()(')11()(' αα ραϕϕ gKBrKexrKf −−+=−+=     (3’). 
This equation has following economic implication: the first term in the right hand side, r, 
represents capital cost for financing both from shareholders and debtors. The second terms 
represents impact of expropriating behavior of controlling owner on his financing cost.  The first 
part of the second term  is the net benefit ratio of expropriation for the controlling owner. 
This term takes negative from its definition, thus if this terms is statistically significant it implies it 
lowers total financing cost of the controlling owner, which induces excess of asset expansion. If this 
term  is not significant, it implies that financing cost is additionally increased, which 
induces insufficient investment. 
 The empirical test equation is reduced from equation (3’) by moving r to left side of the equation 
 12
and taking logarithms from equation (3’). 
)(lnln)1()11ln(ln)ln( 211 ρααϕα gKBrK
Y +−+−+=− .  
   As the term ϕ11− takes negative values by definition, logarithms cannot be taken. By 
replacing )11ln( ϕ− with )1ln()11ln()11ln( −+−=− ϕϕ  and letting ln(-1) be included in the 
error term, expropriation function equation (4) becomes estimable as follows:  
ititgKrK
Y εξρββϕββ ++++−+=− )(lnln)1
1ln()ln( 3210      (4b), 
where 313212112110 /,/,1/,ln/ αββαββαββαββ ==−== B .  is the unobservable that 
affect motivation to expropriate, and  is independent unobservable factors again. 
This specification of expropriation function (4b) is dissimilar to expropriation function (4a). It is 
assumed to capture “source of power to allow expropriation”, that is, the relationship of cash flow 
and control rights here, regardless of the type of expropriation channel, any accounting items that 
were utilized to expropriate as is the focus of accounts receivable in equation (4a). 
This equation has following economic implications: (1) If all the variables in the right hand of 
equation is statistically insignificant, deviation between marginal product of firm and capital cost is 
not a function of expropriation behavior. It could be interpreted as there happens no expropriation. 
(2) If the terms ϕ11− is statistically significant, it implies that expropriation happens regardless of 
the form of expropriation function, which consists of K and/or  . The term ϕ11−  represents net 
cost reduction of financing for controlling owners. (3) If the term ϕ11−  is not statistically 
significant and the terms K and/or  is significant, it represents that net increase of capital cost or 
financing cost for the controlling owners. This implies total asset size of the firm is insufficiently 
large to the optimal level. 
 
 
4  Data and Estimation Strategy 
4.1  Data 
Data from financial statements of all listed companies in China was used and compiled by Sinofin 
Information Services, China Centre for Economic Research, Peking University. The database 
supplied the information available from 1994 to the present. Financial statements of all listed 
companies in China from 1998 to 2007 were used. Information on ownership and corporate 
governance characteristics were also available for the period of 1998 to 2007. In addition to this 
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ready-made data, data on control rights and the number of pyramid layers between the listed firms 
and ultimate controllers were enumerated based on the definition in Section 2. Cash flow rights for 
2006 to 2007 were obtained from disclosed information on pyramidal ownership structure in annual 
reports of all listed firms.  
Table 6 provides summary statistics of key variables. Y represents sales of the main 
operation, K the total assets, and r the profit distribution of investment for the owner. The profit 
distribution of the stakeholder represents the financial cost that firms would pay for debtor and 
shareholders4. As variables for channels for “expropriation” by controllers, it is ideal if exact values 
of accounts receivable to the holding company (the ultimate owner) can be used. These figures have 
been required in the financial statements of all listed companies, at least since 2001. However, 
samples of this data are limited in availability and contradict one another relative to year-to-year 
financial statements. Further, this value is missing for many firms. Therefore, we gave up using the 
account receivable to the holding company, but used accounts receivable as a whole. Other than 
these variables appearing in the theoretical model, the followings were added as control variables: 
(1) year dummies, (2) type of ultimate ownership dummies, and (3) a share reformed dummy.  
 
4.2 Source of Endogeneity and Identification Strategy  
Estimation here is interested in estimating correct size of expropriation. In order to accomplish this 
target, I need to correctly estimate the structural parameters above.  Equations (4a) and (4b) are the 
test equations to be identified, which describe rules on how the controlling owner balances his 
private expropriation motive and a formal profit distribution policy.  In (4a), account-receivables is 
the channel for expropriation of controlling owner. Account receivable for expropriation motives 
reduces profit substantially, as the case of Jinan Qingqi shows. Therefore, it is presumably correlated 
with unobservable expropriating motivation . At the same time, size of profit distributed to debtor 
and shareholders is also correlated with the expropriating motivation . The profit distribution to 
the stakeholders r is endogenous here. In (4b), expropriation is facilitated/constraint by configuration 
of cash flow right and control right, and it is represented in a part of total asset when expropriation is 
realized. Therefore, lnK is endogenous here. As we have endogenous variables in the test equations, 
the equations are estimated by instrumental variables instead of ordinary least squares.  
 
4.3 Instruments 
In order to remedy endogeneity explained above, I need the instruments that are correlated with r or 
                                                  
4 This consists of the following accounting items: (1) financial expense, including payment to 
debtors and others related to financing activity plus (2) loss or profit for minority shareholders plus 
(3) profit to the ordinary owner plus (4) profit to the preferential owner.   
 14
lnK, but are not correlated with error terms. What is the exogenous variation that identifies this 
expropriating action?  I exploited a nature of time structure between formal financial structure and 
expropriating decision; profit distribution to the stake holders and size of total assets are affected by 
both the requirement that is contingent to formal financial structure and the expropriation motives. 
But, usually the former precedes to the latter. Thus indices such as debt and the shares of owners are 
correlated with r or lnK, but not with error terms, because they are independently determined to 
expropriation motives, thus we can expect them to work as instrumental variables5 6.  
      
5  Results 
5.1   Expropriation via Accounts Receivable as it exists for State Controlled Companies  
Table 7 displays results of the estimates of “expropriation via account receivable” equation (4a). 
Comparisons among OLS and fixed effect reveal that the fixed effect estimator corrects 
overestimation due to time invariant factors, but it got underestimated due to lack of care for the 
endogeneity problem in decisions on total asset size. GMM estimates indicate that expropriation by 
the controlling owner occurred for the state owned firms even after the reform of discriminated 
shares was completed. Private owned firms show a weak effect of expropriation when I do not 
distinguish the effect of the discriminated share reform. 
Estimation of a spline function was used to capture the impact of discriminated share reform. 
Lower column of Table 7 shows the results. They indicate that a state controlled firm, even those 
who completed discriminated share reform, are suffered from expropriation by the controlling owner, 
though size of coefficients get smaller. Though the discriminated share reform reduced  
expropriation to some extent, but not resolve the problem completely. For private firms who 
completed share reform, expropriation via accounts receivable disappeared.  
This means that expropriation has not yet disappeared because the pyramidal ownership structure 
still remains. We further test this in more general form of specification; that is, specification of 
“expropriation due to separation of control right and cash-flow right” (equation [4b]).  
 
5.2  Expropriation Due to Separation of Control and Cash-Flow Right 
Table 8 includes results of two specifications of 4(b). Estimates in (i) specify control right itself, and 
                                                  
5 Modigliani-Mirror theorem proposed that  financial structure do not affect the firms value 
(represented in total asset size or profit) if the following three factors do not hold:(1) asymmetry 
effect of bankruptcy to debtor and shareholder, (2) asymmetry effect of tax policy, (3) incentives of 
management. Idea to find instruments variable here depends on the assumption that (1) and (2) 
factors are independent to (3) incentive bias of management, the main interest of this paper.    
6 Endogeneity tests of instruments variables (Ho= IV are exogenous) are not rejected for general 
form, but rejected for expropriation via account receivables. See Table 7 and 8. 
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in (ii) it is specified as . Results show the second specification fits more than the first one. 
Expropriation of the state owned listed firm is affected by configuration of cash flow and control 
rights as well as total asset size. The expropriation become larger when cash flow right is smaller, 
and control right is larger. This implies that the larger the separation between control right and cash 
flow right is, the larger the expropriation. This is a support for the literature that claims separation of 
cash flow and control right generates expropriation for listed state owned companies. Contrary to the 
state owned firms, private owned listed firms shows opposite sings of coefficients for the cash flow 
right and that of control rights is not significant. Configuration of cash flow and control right does 
not affect “expropriation of private owned firms. This is slightly puzzling as will discuss later. 
 
5.3  Model prediction and counterfactual simulation  
As estimation is based on a structural model in this paper, it is possible to retrieve structural 
parameters of expropriation function, and ratio of expropriation out of expropriated account channels 
etc.  The expropriation for the state owned enterprises is estimated to be 6.8 percent of total assets 
in the general form, and to be 7.8 per cent in the form that assume expropriation via account 
receivables. The equation of “expropriation via account receivable” shows that expropriated ratio out 
of total account receivable (Alfa) is 4.4 per cent, and private value, in other word non-economic 
value, of expropriation (P) is 1.7 per cent of total account receivables (Table 9).  For private owned 
firms, the results showed a negative expropriation. 
   Table 10 shows counterfactual simulations. They show how much expropriation would be 
reduced if separation of control and cash-flow rights is resolved, that is, control and cash-flow rights 
are completely identical for all sample firms. Excess investment, or asset inflation, may be reduced 
by about 13 percent for state controlled firms. 
       
5.4 Discussion 
Results here are satisfactory to test the existence of expropriation of listed firm by the state owner. 
Structural model enable us to measure the size of expropriation, its non-economic value for the 
controlling owner, and to implement counterfactual simulation. IV estimation instead of OLS 
drastically improved the measurement of coefficient7.   
  Existence of expropriation is robust for the listed firm under the state owners as all specification 
shows consistent results. They tend to inflate asset for expropriating motives. Non-economic value 
                                                  
7 Size of expropriation based on OLS generates unrealistic figures; expropriation amounted to 226 
per of total assets, and fraction of expropriation from account receivable amounted to 128 per cent of 
account receivable. 
.   
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of expropriation, such as expropriation for political motives, is not negligible (1.7 per cent of 
expropriated items). As most of the state owned enterprises are subject to political guidance by the 
state asset management committees or the government as a whole under the current corporate system, 
this result should be noted. Policy implications here are as follows: (1) the state owned listed firms 
should be the target when the regulatory agency implement minority share holder. (2) Resolution of 
separation of cash flow right and control right, such as listing of ultimate controller itself, is effective 
to reduce expropriation.  Result of privately owned firm is slightly puzzling. Descriptive data 
shows that private owned firm has longer layer of pyramid, smaller cash flow to control right ration. 
But the estimation results shows that their expropriation is negative, asset deflation happened to the 
privately owned firms of China’s listed firm. This is presumably related with asymmetric institution 
for financing among the state owned firms and private owned firms. One possible explanation is 
separation of cash flow and control rights of private owned firm happened due to financial constraint 
of them, but due to expropriating motives. In order to understand what happening to the private firm, 
we need to set up a more appropriate behavioral model considering their financing behavior. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Empirical evidence is presented in this paper indicates that “expropriation” exists for the state owned 
listed firm in China, and it amounted 7 to 8 per cent of total assets in average. If we assume that 
expropriation is done via account receivable, its size is about 5 per cent of the account receivable and 
a part of this expropriation was used for non-economic motives as well. Though the discriminated 
share reform has reduced this expropriation to some extent, the source of problem, separation of cash 
flow right and control right due to pyramiding, still continue to exist. Private owned listed firms 
showed an opposite results to the state owned listed firms. They are not able to invest sufficiently. 
There still asymmetry among the state and private owned firm in the stock market of China.  
 In China, the state still retains control over listed companies; they have direct controlling 
power over economic resources. The state is still the ultimate controlling owner of about 60 percent 
of listed companies. Under this “concentrated and state ownership”, listed companies have been 
termed the “wallet of state owner enterprises or governments.” Result in this paper supports such a 
critical view. Privatization of state ownership and resolution of “pyramidal ownership structures” 
that facilitate “expropriation” are important agendas for China. 
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Figure 1-1 : Cash Flow and Control Rights under Pyramiding  
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Figure 1-2: Cash Flow and Control Rights under Dual Class Shares 
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Table 1: Concentrated Controlling Owners: International Comparison 
Country 
year  # of  
Company 
Largest Block Holder 2nd Largest Block Holder 3rd Largest Block Holder 
  min median mean max min median mean max min median mean max 
China 2000 1318 2.1% 44.6% 45.2% 88.6% 0.0% 5.3% 8.4% 42.4% 0.0% 1.9% 3.3% 24.8% 
2007 1518 0.8% 34.3% 36.0% 95.0% 0.1% 6.4% 8.9% 42.4% 0.0% 2.5% 3.6% 24.3% 
  
France - - 0.0% 20.0% 29.4% 72.7% 0.0% 5.9% 6.4% 19.7% 0.0% 3.4% 3.0% 8.5% 
Germany - 372 0.0% 57.0% 49.6% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.9% 45.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 32.0% 
United Kingdom - 207 3.4% 9.9% 14.4% 78.9% 3.0% 6.6% 7.3% 26.3% 3.0% 5.2% 6.0% 25.7% 
United States  -    
    NYSE - 1309 0.0% 5.4% 8.5% 92.9% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 40.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 25.0% 
    Nasdaq - 2831 0.0% 8.6% 13.0% 99.5% 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 48.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3.0% 24.1% 
(Source) China: Sinofin Data Base. Others: OECD, Corporate Governance: A Survey of OECD Countries, 2001, Table 1.1.
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Table 2: Ownership Types of all Listed Companies  
state private  foreign collective NPO union unknown Total
1999 762 83% 70 8% 9 1% 31 3% 8 1% 7 1% 32 3% 919
2000 1075 82% 129 10% 10 1% 38 3% 7 1% 10 1% 49 4% 1318
2001 962 81% 125 11% 9 1% 37 3% 6 1% 8 1% 38 3% 1185
2002 919 77% 185 16% 10 1% 28 2% 5 0% 7 1% 35 3% 1190
2003 912 73% 268 21% 8 1% 28 2% 7 1% 8 1% 11 1% 1250
2004 924 69% 349 26% 7 1% 23 2% 20 1% 12 1% 2 0% 1337
2005 924 69% 371 28% 6 0% 16 1% 5 0% 13 1% 1 0% 1336
2006 912 65% 453 32% 7 0% 17 1% 5 0% 15 1% 4 0% 1413
2007 919 61% 530 35% 10 1% 28 2% 4 0% 13 1% 1 0% 1518  
(Source)  Sinofin Database.
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Table 3: Discriminated Shares  
2000  2007 
No. of Listed Corporations 894 No. of Listed Corporations 2083 
  
Non-Circulating Shares  56% Restricted Circulation Shares 52% 
Corporate Proposer's Shares 47% State and SOE Shares 42% 
  State Shares 36%     State Shares  33% 
  Domestic Corporation Shares 10%     SOE Shares  9% 
  Foreign Shares 1% Other Domestic Corporation 
Shares  
8% 
Non Proposer's Non-Circulating Shares 9%     Domestic Individual Shares 1% 
  Invited Corporation 6% Foreign Shares 1% 
  Employee 1%     Foreign Corporation Shares 1% 
  Preferential/ Other Shares  2%     Foreign Individual Shares 0% 
  Other Non-Circulation Shares 1% 
 
Circulating Shares 44% No restriction shares 48% 
   A Shares  41%      A Shares  22% 
   B Shares 3%      B Shares 1% 
   H Shares  1%      H Shares  25% 
       Free Circulation Shares  0% 
  
Total Share Number (Billion) 330.78 Total Share Number (Billion) 3478.61
 100%  100% 
(Source) Sino Fin Database 
(Notes) 1) See text for definition of Non-Circulating and Circulating Shares.  
2) A shares are listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen Security Market and transacted only among Chinese 
nationals. B shares are listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Security Market and transacted 
exclusively among foreigners. H shares are listed on security markets abroad such as Hong Kong 
and New York.  
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Table 4? Cash Flow Right, Control Right and Number of Pyramid Layers of all Listed Firms 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
2007: All Listed Firms       
Number of Pyramid Layers 1542 2.3  0.9  1  2  7  
Cash-Flow Right 1542 0.33  0.17  0.01  0.30  1.00  
Control Right 1542 0.38  0.16  0.05  0.37  1.00  
Cash-Flow Right / Control 
Right 
1542 0.84  0.24  0.06  1.00  1.00  
       
2006: All Listed Firm       
Number of Pyramid Layers 1432 2.3  0.8  1  2  7  
Cash-Flow Right 1431 0.32  0.17  0.01  0.30  0.99  
Control Right 1432 0.38  0.15  0.07  0.36  0.99  
Cash-Flow Right / Control 
Right 
1431 0.83  0.25  0.05  1.00  1.00  
       
2007: State Controlled Firms       
Number of Pyramid Layers 792 2.4  0.8  1  2  6  
Cash-Flow Right 792 0.35  0.16  0.02  0.34  0.84  
Control Right 792 0.39  0.15  0.05  0.39  0.84  
Cash-Flow Right / Control 
Right 
792 0.90  0.19  0.10  1.00  1.00  
Share of the Largest Owner  792 0.38  0.15  0.04  0.37  0.84  
       
2007: Privately Controlled Firms 
Number of Pyramid Layers 361 2.5  0.9  1  2  7  
Cash-Flow Right 361 0.23  0.14  0.01  0.20  0.78  
Control Right 361 0.31  0.14  0.09  0.28  0.91  
Cash-Flow Right / Control 
Right 
361 0.70  0.27  0.06  0.76  1.00  
Share of the Largest Owner  361 0.30  0.13  0.05  0.27  0.78  
 
2007: Share Structure Reform Completed  
Number of Pyramid Layers 1192 2.40  0.82  1.00  2  7 
Cash-Flow Right 1192 0.31  0.16  0.06  0.29  0.84  
Control Right 1192 0.37  0.15  0.05  0.36  0.91  
Cash-Flow Right / Control 
Right 
1192 0.83  0.24  0.01  1.00  1 
Share of the Largest Owner  1192 0.35  0.15  0.04  0.34  0.84  
Note 
1) 2007 data includes information for companies that were in prepared listings but not yet 
issuing shares. Therefore, some corporation control and cash flow rights are 100 percent. 
2) The sample of state controlled and privately controlled firms does not include all listed companies, but 
only the ones used in estimation. 
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Table 5: Financial Status of Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle 1998-2003 
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1998 53.4% n.a. n.a. 3.6% n.a. n.a. 14.5% 1,950 3,290 
1999 61.0% 16.9% 58.1% 16.2% 2.4% n.a. 0.9% 902 3,850 
2000 62.7% 31.6% 61.6% 17.5% 1.7% n.a. -6.6% 534 4,150 
2001 71.4% 35.9% 77.2% 19.1% 2.0% 13.6% -20.7% 643 3,460 
2002 14.9% 64.4% 316.7% 76.4% 4.0% 75.5% -357.1% 661 954 
2003 16.4% 30.8% 105.8% 43.6% 1.5% 0.0% 0.9% 983 2,029 
?Source?Sino Fin Database for 1998-2003, Annual Report of Jinan Qingqi Motorcycle Co. Ltd.  
(Note 1) These are normalized by total assets other than notice. 2) Ultimate owner shares remained at 40.9 percent during the whole period in the table. 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of Key Variables  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Turnover / Total asset 10478 0.61 0.51  -0.08  10 
Profit paid to stakeholders/ Total asset 10478 0.03 0.02  -0.08  0.49 
Accounts Receivable/ Total asset 10478 0.19 0.13  0.00  1.18 
Debt Asset Ratio 10478 0.49 0.37  0.00  16 
Share of 1st Largest Owner  10461 0.42 0.17  0.01  1  
Share of 2nd largest owner 10461 0.09 0.08  0.00  1  
Share of 3rd largest owner  10461 0.03 0.04  0.00  0.25 
Share reform completed  10478 0.24 0.43  0  1  
Dummies of Ownership of Ultimate Controller     
  State  10478 0.70 0.46  0  1  
  Private 10478 0.19 0.39  0  1  
  Foreign 10478 0.01 0.08  0  1  
  Collective 10478 0.02 0.14  0  1  
  NPO 10478 0.01 0.08  0  1  
  Union 10478 0.01 0.09  0  1  
   
Sample with Cash-Flow Right, Control Right and Number of Pyramid Layer   
Turnover /K 2454 0.72 0.60  -0.02  10.02 
Profit paid to stake holders/ Total asset 2454 0.02 0.02  -0.07  0.49 
Accounts Receivable/ Total asset 2454 0.17 0.12  0.00  0.99 
Debt Asset Ratio 2454 0.55 0.37  0.00  7.33 
Number of Pyramid Layers  2454 2.36 0.80  1.00  7.00 
Cash-Flow Right  2453 0.31 0.16  0.01  0.84 
Control Right 2454 0.37 0.15  0.05  0.91 
Share of 1st Largest Owner  2451 0.36 0.15  0.04  0.84 
Share of 2nd Largest Owner 2451 0.08 0.08  0.00  0.42 
Share of 3rd Largest Owner  2451 0.03 0.03  0.00  0.24 
Share Reform Completed  2454 0.94 0.23  0  1  
Dummies of Ownership of Ultimate Controller     
  State  2454 0.66 0.47  0  1  
  Private 2454 0.30 0.46  0  1  
  Foreign 2454 0.01 0.08  0  1  
  Collective 2454 0.01 0.12  0  1  
  NPO 2454 0.00 0.05  0  1  
  Union 2454 0.01 0.10  0  1  
(Source) Sino Fin Database  
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Table 7:  Expropriation after Share Reform: ex(K)=ARln(K)  
Dependent  Sales/Total asset
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Estimator OLS FE gmm gmm gmm gmm
# of obs 10461 10461 10461 10461 2545 2545
# of firms 1245 ?
Sample 1998-2007 2006-07 2006-07
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Rental fee of capital   r 2.6 0.2 *** 0.8 0.1 *** 24.7 3.2 *** 29.3 3.42 *** 28.4 10.1 ** 29.7 10.3 ***
Expropriation ? AR/K(=private) 1.4 0.1 *** 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.52 0.11 *** -0.34 0.8 -0.89 0.7
Expropriation*1/share ? AR/K*1/shar(=private) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.02 0.0 *
Expropriation*SOE 0.6 0.1 *** -0.1 0.1 0.9 0.1 *** 1.26 0.3 ***
Expropriation*SOE*1/share -0.1 0.0 *** 0.0 0.0 ** -0.1 0.0 *** -0.02 0.0 **
Expropriation*others 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1 ** 0.4 0.2 * 0.93 1.4
Expropriation*others*1/share -0.1 0.0 ** 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.09 0.1
Expropriation*Reformed?(=private) 1.07 0.43 ** -0.01 0.8
Expropriation*Reformed*1/share -0.26 0.09 ** -0.02 0.0
Expropriation * Reformed*SOE 1.73 0.34 *** 1.3 0.3 ***
Expropriation*Reformed:SOE*1/share -0.21 0.06 *** -0.02 0.0 **
Expropriation * Reformed*others 2.13 1.76 0.38 1.8
Expropriation*Reformed*others*1/share -0.21 0.28 -0.07 0.09
Endogeneity test (Ho= variables are exogenous) 99.9 161.5 23.7 25.6
(p=.00) (p=.00) (p=.00) (p=.00)
Fit/Test of Over Identification 0.59 0.06 35.8 8.1 1.3 1.0
within (p=.00) (p=.0044) (p=.718) (p=.8119)
0.0
Wald chi square/F value(d.f.) 1372 450 138 178 48 51
variable for share of controling owner ontrol right control right control right control right cash flow right cash flow right  
(Source) Author 
(Note1) All regression include year dummies and controlling owner type dummies.  
(Note2)  Results of expropriation items x ownership reported linear combination of estimates expropriation and *ownerships.  
(Note3)  FE is the fixed effect on stock code (=respective firm) 
(Note4) Instruments for (iii) and (iv) are total debt (logarithm) and shares of 1st largest owners, for (v) and (iv) are total debt (log) and 1st to 3rd largest 
owners’ share . 
?Note5? Due to limitation of data, data? used for? share of controlling owner, ? of the test equation is “control right” not “cash flow right” for 
1998-2007 sample, but is “cash flow right” for 2006-07 sample definition in the text. 
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Table 8: Expropriation post- the Discriminated Share Reform period 
Dependent  ln (sales/total asset - rental fee of capital??  expropriation)
(i) (ii)
Estimator GMM GMM
# of obs 2421 2429
# of firms
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
ln total asset -5.60 3.67 -4.74 2.71 *
ln  total asset * reformed 0.67 0.36 * 0.63 0.25 **
ln  total asset * reformed*SOE 0.30 0.14 ** 0.25 0.11 **
ln  total asset * reformed*others 0.51 0.70 0.33 0.50
ln control right 2.40 2.12
ln control right*reformed 0.81 0.88
ln control right*reformed*SOE -0.45 0.64
ln control right*reformed*others 1.49 5.07
ln (1/control right-1) -1.79 1.24
ln (1/control right-1)*reformed 0.04 0.12
ln (1/control right-1)*reformed*SOE -0.14 0.08 *
ln (1/control right-1)*reformed*others -0.51 0.48
ln ( 1/cash flow right-1) 0.98 1.41 1.60 1.25
ln (1/cash flow right-1 )*reformed 0.02 0.13 -0.36 0.20 *
ln (1/cash flow right-1) *reformed*SOE -0.08 0.24 0.23 0.08 ***
ln ( 1/cashflow right-1) *reformed*others 0.30 0.96 0.22 0.59
Test of Over Identification 19.4 20.3
(p=.0016) (p=.0011)
Endogeneity test 9.2 11.8
(Ho=variables are exogenous) (p=.0561) (p=.0191)
Firs stage F value (P>z) 
 lnK 0.00 0.00
 lnK_reformed 0.00 0.00
 lnK_reformed*SOE 0.00 0.00
 lnK_reformed*others 0.12 0.27
Instruments
total debt(log)
share of 1st to 8th
owener
total debt(log)
share of 1st to
8th owener  
Notes: 
1) All regressions include a year dummy and an ultimate owner type dummy.  
2) Results of expropriation items x ownership are reported as a linear combination of estimates of 
expropriation and ownership dummies.  
3) FE is the fixed effect on stock code (firm code). 
4) Bold type indicates that statistical estimates of P>|z| are lower than 10%.   
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Table 9.  Size of Expropriation (Estimated ex(K) / Total asset K ) 
Estimated  Obs Mean S.D. Min Max   
General form        
State Owned 1540 .0683 .580 .00019 16.71   
Private Owned 738 -13.6 120.8 -2888 0   
Via Account Receivable             Alfa      P 
State Owned  1621 .0784 .0764 1.36e-14 .455 .044 .017 
Private Owned 738 -.0240 .267 6.72e 15 -.012 .067 
Note: 
1) Alfa in via account receivable indicates ratio of fraction for expropriation of account receivables.  
P indicates ratio of private (non monetary) benefit out of expropriation. See text for details. 
 
 
Table10.  Form of Expropriation Function and Counterfactual Simulation 







76.01695.1 −− Ke  
Simulated ex(K) /Estimated ex(K):mean .8699 .6384 
Note:  
1) Estimates of equation (ii) in Table . 
2) Multipliers of terms are divided by the coefficient of term (1-1/?). 
3) Both on the firms that completed “discriminated share reform”. 
4) Simulation for the case if size of cash flow right is equalized to that of control right. 
 
